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1. On 8 July 2009, the European Commission (the “Commission”) adopted a much
awaited Final Report (the “Report” or the “Final Report”) in the context of its sector
inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector.1 This Report formally closes a 18 months-long
investigation which, in essence, sought to establish whether originator companies’
conduct delayed generics medicines entry and stifled innovation, thereby limiting both
originator-generic competition as well as originator-originator competition.2
2. Since the early days of its inception, the Commission’s sector inquiry – which has
subsequently been compared to a “fishing expeditio(n) in disguise” – has sparked a
great deal of controversy.3 First, by contrast to previous sector inquiries, the scope of
the Commission’s investigation has been particularly wide with more than a hundred
stakeholders requested to provide information (including 43 originators and 27 generic
companies, as well as wholesalers, parallel traders, national health authorities, Member
States’ marketing authorisation bodies and competition authorities).4
Second, the Commission has made full use of its investigative powers under Regulation
1/2003,5 sending numerous requests for information (often under extremely tight
deadlines), and conducting, for the first time in the context of a sector inquiry, on-the-
spot inspections (dawn raids) on the premises of several pharmaceutical companies.6
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Abstract
On 8 July 2009, the European Commission’s released itslong-awaited Final Report on its Pharmaceutical
Sector Inquiry. The Final Report suggests that the
shortcomings of the regulatory framework are a key
explanatory factor for delayed generic entry and limited
innovation. Meanwhile the Final Report nuances earlier,
provisional, findings, that pharmaceutical companies’
conduct had blocked/limited generic entry and led to a
decline in the number of new chemical entities reaching the
market. The purpose of the present “Tendances” is to
provide an overview of the Final Report and to discuss the
Commission’s findings.
La Commission européenne vient d’adopter, le 8 juillet2009, son rapport d’enquête final sur le secteur
pharmaceutique. Ce rapport souligne que les retards
observés dans la mise sur le marché des médicaments
génériques et le recul apparent de l’innovation dans le sec-
teur pharmaceutique découlent de manière significative du
cadre réglementaire applicable. En outre, le rapport vient
nuancer de précédentes constatations, qui stigmatisaient
les pratiques des entreprises pharmaceutiques. L’objet du
présent  « Tendances » est de fournir un aperçu critique du
rapport final de la Commission européenne.
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1 See Communication from the Commission – Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report.
See also Commission Staff Working Document (Technical annex to the Commission Communication), Parts 1
and 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html. The scope of
the sector inquiry has been circumscribed to human pharmaceutical products focusing predominantly on
prescription medicines.
2 See Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector pursuant
to Article 17 of Council Regulation 1/2003 (Case COMP/D2/39.514). The inquiry related “to the
introduction of innovative and generic medicines for human consumption on the market”. See also
MEMO/08/20 of 16 January 2008, Antitrust – sector inquiry into pharmaceuticals – frequently asked
questions.
3 See H. Andersson and E. Legnerfält, “Dawn Raids in Sector Inquiries – Fishing Expeditions in Disguise?”,
[2008] ECLR, 439. Whilst sector inquiries do not necessarily purport to lead to subsequent enforcement
proceedings (amongst other things, their purpose is to allow the Commission to gain a better understanding of
specific markets and/or commercial practices), the Commission seems increasingly to consider sector inquiries
as a tool for uncovering infringements of EC competition law. This appeared particularly clearly in the
aftermath of the energy sector inquiry, with the Commission launching two antitrust proceedings against E.ON.
4 See Communication from the Commission – Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
Report, p. 4. The Commission’s requests for information covered all 27 EU Member States over the period
2000-2007. Several issues such as parallel were progressively set aside during the course of the sector inquiry.
5 See Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, pp. 1–25 (Articles 18-20).
6 Before the adoption of the Final Report. On 16 January 2008, the Commission conducted unannounced
inspections on the premises of a number of originator and generic companies in Europe, including
(according to press reports) Pfizer, Merck, Sanofi-Aventis, GSK, Astra Zeneca, Novartis, Johnson &
Johnson and Teva. See S. Creighton and S. Russell, “Comment on the EC’s Pharmaceutical Dawn Raids”,
Global Competition Policy Online, Feb-08(1) & (2)
Voir aussi : “Regulation 1/2003: 
Time for a review?” GCLC Conference, Brussels, 11-12/06/2009 
sur concurrences.com
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Third, the Commission’s substantive concerns have been
repeatedly challenged as misplaced, in particular following the
adoption of its Preliminary Report on 28 November 2008.7 In this
Preliminary Report, the Commission reached the controversial,
provisional, finding that there was a clear-cut competition
problem in the market,8 primarily due to the fact that originators
conduct had “contributed to generic delay as well as to the
difficulties in innovation”.9 Whilst conceding that several
exogenous shortcomings of the regulatory framework might
also have contributed to generic delays and limited innovation,
officials from the Commission repeatedly stressed that the focus
was on companies’ behaviour,10 and not on regulatory issues.11 In
this context, the Preliminary Report identified in a somewhat
colourful, pejorative, language a “tool-box” of strategic
instruments possibly designed and used by originators to delay
and/or block generic entry: patent clusters or thickets, patent
disputes and litigation, opposition and appeal procedures before
the European Patent Office (“EPO”), patent settlements and other
agreements, originators interventions before marketing authorities
and pricing reimbursement authorities, and originators’ launching
of second generation and follow-on products.12
3. However, the public consultation process that followed the
Preliminary Report unleashed a thorny policy discussion.
Unexpectedly, most stakeholders including generic companies,
instead of blaming originators, stigmatised the shortcomings of the
regulatory framework (fragmentation of the patent court system,
excessive duration of patent opposition procedures, award of weak
patents, heavy burdens imposed by drug testing requirements, etc.)
as a key explanatory factor for generic delay, hence marginalising
the Preliminary Report’s findings against originators. Moreover, in
light of the controversial decisional precedent in AstraZeneca,13 and
of the Court of First Instance’s judgment in ITT Promedia,14 many
doubts were raised as to whether Article 82 EC could constitute
a solid legal basis to challenge originators’ unilateral conduct.
4. The Commission’s Final Report bears testimony of this
debate. Unlike the Preliminary Report, the Final Report’s
semantics are far more neutral as regards originators’ conduct.
More importantly, whilst the Report contends that there are
competition problems in the pharmaceutical industry and that
originators may try (have tried) to delay the entry of generics
medicines through a number of potentially problematic
practices (and in particular, through settlement agreements
which seem to fall squarely within the ambit of Article 81 EC,
and which will be subject to “focused monitoring”),15 it
expressly endorses the view that the shortcomings of the
regulatory framework also play a critical role in delaying
generic entry and reducing innovation.16 There is thus a
noticeable contrast between the Commission’s early muscular
stance, and the more consensual tone of its Final Report.
5. Overall, as a matter of enforcement policy, the outcome of
the sector inquiry appears particularly slim. Whilst the
Commission’s inquiry has triggered a wide (and welcome)
debate on the adequacy of the regulatory framework, it has
only uncovered one case of potential infringement of Article
81 and/or 82 EC,17 thereby indicating that anticompetitive
practices in the pharmaceutical sector are not as pervasive as
was initially suspected.18 Of course, the finding that unlawful,
anticompetitive, conduct is not widespread in the
pharmaceutical sector should, in itself, be a cause of
satisfaction. This notwithstanding, if an ex post input/output
perspective is taken on the Commission’s use of its limited
administrative resources, one may beg the controversial
question of whether the decision to open a sector inquiry was
in the first place warranted (or whether the criterion enshrined
in Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 are sufficiently accurate).19
This question is all the more relevant because the opening of a
sector inquiry imposes heavy costs on companies (e.g.,
disruption of ongoing business processes, investors’
7 See DG Competition Staff Working Paper, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,
Preliminary Report, 28 November 2008, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary
_report.pdf.
8 See N. Kroes, Antitrust: preliminary report of sector inquiry into
pharmaceuticals, Opening remarks at press conference, Brussels, 28th
November 2008 (“we find that competition in this industry does not work as
well as it should”).
9 See the numerous pronouncements in that sense of the DG Competition Staff
Working Paper, as well as Communication from the Commission –
Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, p. 6.
10 See presentation of P. Gasparon at IEJE-FUSL Half-day Conference on the
Commission’s Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 14 January 2009.
11 Another official of the Commission is reported to have explained that the
focus of the Commission’s inquiry was not on regulatory issues, on which
the Commission has no authority to deal with. See Presentations and
speeches, Public presentation of preliminary findings on 28 November 2008,
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html 
12 See DG Competition Staff Working Paper, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,
Preliminary Report, 28 November 2008, p.5. Those practices are not
necessarily being used in isolation, but are allegedly also combined by
originators to delay generic entry. 
13 See Commission Decision of 15 June 2005, Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3 –
AstraZeneca. See, on this, B. Bär-Bouyssière, “Patently dangerous – A faulty
notion of “regulatory abuse” haunts the pharma sector inquiry”, Competition
Law Insight, 5 May 2009.
14 See Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v. Commission, [1998] ECR II-2937.
15 See Communication from the Commission – Executive Summary of the
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, p. 27.
16 Idem. The Commission observes (i) that a Community patent and a unified
specialised patent system would reduce administrative costs and uncertainty
for companies; and (ii) that Member States should limit third parties
submissions, accelerate approvals for generics medicines, take action if
misleading information campaigns question the quality of generics
medicines, and streamline trials that test the added value of novel medicines.
17 See MEMO/09/322 of 8 July 2009, Antitrust: Commission opens formal
proceedings against Les Laboratoires Servier and a number of generic
pharmaceutical companies. The Commission’s press release attempts to
disconnect formally this investigation from the sector inquiry, in expressly
indicating that: “The present investigation does not form part of the sector
inquiry, but the knowledge acquired during the sector inquiry has allowed
the Commission to draw conclusions on the areas where Commission action
based on competition law could be appropriate and effective”. A plausible
reason for this may be that the Commission seeks to preclude the parties
from accessing to the entire sector inquiry file. 
18 The Commission’s inquiry has also uncovered many internal documents
where employees of originator companies were expressing their intent to
delay and/or block generic competition. Yet, evidence of anticompetitive
intent is not, as such, sufficient to establish a competition law infringement.
19 In particular at a time where the Commission seems adamant to define
optimal enforcement priorities. See in this context, Communication from the
Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by
dominant undertakings, 9 February 2009 – C(2009) 864 final.
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defiance,20 etc.)21 as well as on the Commission itself (e.g.,
the opportunity cost of not monitoring other sectors where
competition law infringements may take place).22
6. Of course, this sector inquiry has indirect competition
advocacy merits. In particular, the Commission has certainly
promoted the degree of spontaneous compliance with the law,
in increasing the awareness of pharmaceutical operators to
risks of competition law exposure. This being said, however,
because the Final Report is primarily factual in nature, it
provides only little, if no, guidance on the boundaries between
lawful and unlawful conduct. To maximise the return of its
investigative effort, and help pharmaceutical firms comply
with EC competition law, we thus believe that the Commission
should build upon the factual findings of its Report to provide
positive legal guidance to pharmaceutical firms.23
7. The purpose of the present “Tendances” is to provide an
overview of, as well as a forum for debate on, the Final Report.
The authors are distinguished competition law and intellectual
property specialists who have closely followed the
Commission’s inquiry. Many thanks to all of them for having
accepted to devote time and thinking to this fascinating issue. !
20 Investors are generally reluctant to finance firms subject to potential
competition law scrutiny. In the context of the current economic crisis, one
cannot exclude that risks of future antitrust exposure might prompt investors
to cut R&D spending, thereby hampering originators’ investment into
innovative drugs. 
21 Paradoxically, whilst the Commission criticizes the costs imposed by the
fragmented regulatory/litigation system in Europe on pharmaceutical
companies, it does not question the costs imposed by its own sector inquiry
on the same firms.
22 The Commission has established a “Pharma Task Force” to conduct the
sector inquiry. The Task Force boasted approximately 40 case-handlers from
DG Competition and was led by a senior official.
23 For instance through the adoption of soft law instruments (e.g., guidelines)
or through inapplicability decisions pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation
1/2003.
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1. DG Competition’s release of its long-awaited Final Report
on its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry on 8 July 2009 was
somewhat of a damp squib compared to the fireworks
surrounding the publication of its Interim Report some eight
months earlier. The release of the Interim Report in November
2008 was a Brussels media event, with press briefings, press
releases, and an all-day public hearing that was covered by the
Commission’s live television channel.24 The Interim Report
elicited vociferous criticism from the pharmaceutical industry.
Innovative pharmaceutical companies – or “originator”
companies to use the Report’s terminology – were concerned
that practices that they deemed to be critical to the protection
of their patents were being called into question. These
concerns were set out in detail in the numerous submissions
that were made to DG Competition after the publication of the
Interim Report.25
2. In contrast, the release of the Final Report was a low-key
affair, with just a routine press conference and relatively light
press coverage. The reaction to the Final Report from both
sides of the debate was muted, but generally positive. Both
EFPIA – the trade association representing originator
companies – and EGA – the generic companies’ trade
association – welcomed the Report’s emphasis on the need for
reform of the regulatory system.26
I. A more balanced, holistic approach
3. This positive reaction from both sides of the debate
highlights the Final Report’s more balanced and holistic
approach when compared to the Interim Report. DG
Competition clearly took on board many of the comments
submitted in response to the Interim Report. First, it toned
down the emotive rhetoric used in the Interim Report. It went
out of its way to explain that the use of various terms that had
attracted so much criticism in the Interim Report because they
were viewed has having a pejorative connotation inconsistent
with a Report that purported to be neutral – “tool box”, “patent
clusters”, “defensive” patenting, “secondary” patents – were
not intended to have such a connotation. For example, it
explained that “secondary” patents “should […] not be
understood to mean that these patents are of a lower quality or
value, but merely that – from a time perspective – they follow
the primary patent.”27
4. Second, the DG Competition recognized that practices by
originator companies contribute to delays in generic entry, but
that shortcomings in the regulatory framework are a major
factor. In releasing the Final Report, Commissioner Kroes
emphasized the need for less “red tape”.28 To this end, the
Report puts forward a number of concrete proposals aimed at
getting rid of this red tape:
! The establishment of a single Community patent and a
unified, specialized patent litigation system in Europe. These
changes would reduce the costs and administrative burdens
associated with multiple patent filings, eliminate parallel
litigation between the same parties in different Member States,
and enhance legal certainty through the avoidance of multiple
rulings.
! The European Patent Office should continue with initiatives
designed to maintain a high quality standard in granting
patents and to accelerate procedures (such as limiting the time
during which divisional patent applications may be filed).
24 DG Competition’s website has a specific section devoted to the pharma
sector inquiry, including webcasts of the remarks of vary participants at the
hearing.
25 These submissions are on DG Competition’s website.
26 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Highlights Regulatory Shortcomings and
Need for Strong, Effective Patent System in Europe, EFPIA Press Release, 8
July 2009; European Commission Inquiry Recommends Systemic
Improvements to Ensure Immediate Access for Patients to Affordable
Generic Medicines upon Patent Expiry, EGA Press Release, 8 July 2009.
27 Final Report, ¶ 20.
28 Shortcomings in Pharmaceutical Sector Require Further Action, European
Commission Press Release, IP/09/1098 9 (8 July 2009).
PROCEED WITH CAUTION ACROSS THE
IP/COMPETITION INTERSECTION
David W. HULL
Adjunct Professor, University of Liège School of Law
Lawyer, Brussels
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! Member States should ensure that market authorization
approvals are not delayed by third party submissions, which
should be kept to a minimum and made in a transparent way.
! Member States should generally accelerate approval
procedures for generics. In particular, generics should
automatically receive pricing/reimbursement status where the
originator company’s product already has such status.
Submissions by third parties should be kept to a minimum and
not be allowed to delay the procedure.
5. The fact that a key set of conclusions in the Final Report
focuses on regulatory reform as opposed to competition law
issues highlights that, as an institutional matter, the sector
inquiry evolved into an exercise that presented a significant
challenge to DG Competition. The inquiry started out with a
focus on commercial practices of companies leading to delays
of generics onto the market and fewer new drugs coming to
market.29 The Interim Report reflected this focus. However, as
the investigation progressed and DG Competition received
additional input from industry in response to the Interim
Report, it became apparent that the most significant problem
was the regulatory system, not companies’ commercial
practices. Rather than limiting itself to narrow conclusions
limited to the competition issues presented by commercial
practices, DG Competition showed a laudable degree of
institutional flexibility by interpreting its mandate in a broad
manner. As a result, it was able to propose a broad set of policy
recommendations the recognize the unusual complexity of the
pharmaceutical sector. 
II. A more cautious approach
to issues at the IP/Competition
intersection
6. In addition to adopting a more balanced approach, the Final
Report takes a more cautious approach to issues arising at the
IP/competition intersection that is more in line with existing
case law. One of the main criticisms levied at the Interim
Report was that it appeared to suggest that a whole range of
practices used by originator companies to maximize the value
of their intellectual property rights were problematic under the
competition rules. It described these practices as belonging to
a nefarious “tool box” of instruments used by originator
companies to delay the entry of generics onto the market.
Competition lawyers were concerned because, under
established competition law principles, many of the practices
would only give rise to issues in exceptional circumstances.
Intellectual property experts were troubled by the suggestion
that practices that are common, not just in the pharmaceutical
sector, but in all high-tech sectors, such as taking out
numerous patents around an invention, were incompatible with
the competition rules. If DG Competition was suggesting that
these practices were generally problematic, it was espousing a
position that was not only inconsistent with existing law, but
that risked chilling the innovation that intellectual property
rights were designed to foster.
7. In the Final Report, DG Competition signals its intention to
proceed cautiously at the IP/competition intersection. It starts
out by emphasizing the crucial importance of innovation to the
pharmaceutical sector and the key role of intellectual property
rights in promoting innovation.30 In discussing the application
of competition law to practices involving intellectual property
rights, it acknowledges that these practices would only give
rise to infringements in “exceptional circumstances”.31 In its
discussion of some of the main practices examined in the
Report, it does not articulate clearly when competition
concerns are likely to arise, but it generally adopts an approach
that is much more cautious than that indicated in the Interim
Report: 
1. Patent strategies 
8. The Interim Report suggested that the common practice of
filing so-called “secondary” patents around the original patent
could be anticompetitive. This position was heavily criticized.
First, DG Competition was second-guessing the patent system,
something which it is not competent to do in either a legal or
technical sense. Patent law is the domain of the Member States
and, even if DG Competition had the power to rule on whether
the grant of a secondary patent were appropriate, its officials
do not possess the necessary technical expertise in this area.
Second, the Interim Report’s discussion of secondary patents
appeared to be based on the false premise that such secondary
patents are of lesser quality that the primary patents covering
the original product. Inventions, whether break-through
developments or incremental developments must meet the
same test for patentability. Absent fraud, applying for a patent
is entirely legitimate and it should not matter whether a
company applies for one or multiple patents. Indeed, any
attempt to limit the number of patents for which a company
may apply will necessarily result in arbitrary rules that are
inconsistent with a company’s rights under the patent system
because there is no principled way to determine how many
patents is too many.
9. The Final Report indicates that filing for numerous patents
on an invention is common practice and, taken alone, is not
necessarily problematic. Competition concerns are most likely
to arise when the originator company is filing for patents for
the purpose of excluding competitors such as where it files for
a patent, but does not use the patent and refuses requests to
license the patent.32 This more limited approach is much more
in line with current law.
29 See Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the
pharmaceutical sector (“There are indications of commercial practices by
pharmaceutical suppliers […] which may not serve to protect innovation but
to block innovative and/or generic competition, litigation. […] In order to
establish the extent of the above-mentioned practices and to assess them
fully in their proper factual and economic context, the use of formal
investigative powers such as those granted to the Commission for sector
inquiries is required.”)
30 Final Report, ¶¶ 9-10.
31 Final Report, ¶ 1568. 
32 Final Report, ¶ 1571.
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2. Patent litigation
10. The Interim Report suggested by broad innuendo that
originator companies that pursue patent litigation against
generics could be engaged in anti-competitive conduct. This
suggestion gave rise to criticism because, under existing case
law, patent litigation could only constitute anti-competitive
conduct in the rarest of circumstances. If the company holds a
dominant position, such litigation could be challenged as
abusive under Article 82. In ITT Promedia33 – the leading case
on the abuse knows as “vexatious litigation” – both the
Commission and the European Court of First Instance (CFI)
made it clear that such a challenge will rarely be successful. In
that case, the Commission advocated a strict test for
determining whether the commencement of litigation is
abusive: the claim must be “manifestly unfounded” and it must
be brought with the aim of eliminating competition.34 The
Commission stated that litigation that may reasonably be
considered as an attempt to assert rights against competitors is
not abusive, even if it is part of a plan to eliminate competition.
The CFI agreed with the Commission, stressing that the ability
to assert one’s rights through the courts is a basic principle of
law common to the constitutional traditions of the all member
states and that only in “wholly exceptional circumstances” will
the commencement of legal proceedings be considered an
abuse of a dominant position.35 Applying these principles in
the context of patent litigation brought by a dominant
pharmaceutical company against a generic competitor, it
would seem extremely difficult to establish that the litigation is
“manifestly unfounded” because these cases typically turn on
difficult issues of fact (such as whether a generic is the
biological equivalent of the patented drug).
11. The Final Report appears to recognize that, as a general
rule, a company is entitled to enforce its patent rights, even if
this creates obstacles for generic companies. It notes that
“[e]nforcing patent rights is legitimate and constitutes a
fundamental right guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights”.36
3. Patent settlements
12. The treatment of patent settlements is one area where the
Final Report does not differ significantly from the Interim
Report. The Final Report suggests that competition concerns
are likely to arise with respect to agreements designed to keep
competitors out of the market, in particular patent settlement
agreements that limit generic entry and include a value transfer
from the originator company to the generic company.37
13. As patent settlements can take a wide variety of forms, it is
to be hoped that DG Competition will evaluate them on their
merits, even those involving a reverse payment. As a general
rule, patents must be presumed to be valid. Thus, as a general
matter, settlements that do not impose restrictions on the
generic company that run beyond the term of the patent should
benefit from the same presumption. The suggestion that patent
settlements, particularly those involving a reverse payment, are
generally problematic under the competition rules is
inconsistent with this general principle. Moreover, there may
be entirely legitimate reasons for payments. For instance, in
many European countries, the innovative company will stand
to lose financially even if it ultimately wins the patent
litigation because it will not be able to recover an amount of
damages from the generic company adequate to compensate it
for lost sales during the period between the launch of the
generic and the judgment. Thus, an innovative company may
prefer to pay the generic to stay off the market until the final
judgment is rendered.
III. A need for guidelines
14. For many, the Final Report was a disappointment because
DG Competition declined to provide any guidance on the
competition law analysis of the various practices reviewed in
the course of the sector inquiry, stating: “It is important to
underline that – whilst the report primarily analyses company
behavior – it does not identify individual cases of wrongdoing
or provide any guidance on the compatibility of the practices
examined with the EC competition rules. It provides the
Commission however with relevant context and a factual basis
for deciding whether and what further action is needed,
including enforcement action.”38
15. Instead of providing general guidance, DG Competition
has announced that it plans to pursue litigation against
individual companies where it deems appropriate.39
16. The problem with this approach is that innovative
pharmaceutical companies are left facing an undesirable
degree of legal uncertainty concerning practices that are not
only common in the industry, but, in most cases, should not
give rise to competition concerns. Litigation is no substitute
for guidelines in providing a coherent legal framework for
assessing the various practices at issue. It could take years for
an issue to wind its way through the administrative and judicial
phases of the procedure. In the meantime, companies will be
left guessing as to whether a given practice is acceptable,
which could chill innovation. More importantly, litigation is
likely to result in an incomplete and unbalanced legal
framework erected on the basis of principles developed in a
piecemeal, ad hoc fashion.
17. A better approach would be to develop a holistic set of
guidelines. As case law develops, these guidelines could be
amended to reflect the law’s evolution, which is what DG
Competition routinely does in other areas where it has issued
guidelines. As with other guidelines put out by DG
Competition – most recently the Article 82 guidelines – there
should be a broad public consultation on the draft, which
33 ITT Promedia NV v. Commission, 1998 ECR II-2937.
34 Id. at ¶¶ 55-56.
35 Id. at ¶ 60.
36 Final Report, ¶ 548.
37 Final Report, ¶ 1573.
38 Final Report, ¶ 22.
39 See Final Report, ¶¶ 1571, 1575-76. 
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would allow key players to bring their expertise to the table.
Consultation with all stakeholders would seem to be
particularly important here as such guidelines could implicate
not only competition policy, but also intellectual property and
health care policies. 
IV. Conclusion
18. The Final Report is a marked improvement over the
Interim Report. It is more balanced in its conclusions,
recognizing that problems with the regulatory system are a key
cause for delays of generic entry onto the market. While DG
Competition found that the practices of originator companies
also contribute to these delays, it acknowledged that these
practices only raise competition concerns in exceptional
circumstances. 
19. Unfortunately, the Final Report fails to offer any useful
guidance on what these circumstances are. DG Competition’s
silence on the relevant competition analysis is troubling
because a core issue raised by the Sector Inquiry is whether
the competition rules may be used to place limits on the ability
of pharmaceutical companies to exercise and defend their
patent rights, which is one of the most complex and
controversial areas of competition law. Unless DG
Competition breaks this silence and offers some guidance,
companies will be forced to operate in an unhealthy climate of
legal uncertainty. They will be advised to proceed across the
oftentimes hazardous intersection of intellectual property and
competition law with extreme caution. !
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I. Introduction and summary
of conclusions40
1. On 8 July 2009, the Competition Directorate of the
European Commission (‘DG COMP’) published its Final
Report on the pharmaceutical sector inquiry (‘the Final
Report’).41 Like the Preliminary Report published on
28 November 2008,42 the Final Report concludes that the entry
of generic medicines onto the market is being delayed
(compared to the perfect competition scenario of generic entry
immediately upon patent expiry) and that there has been a
decline in the number of new chemical entities (‘NCEs’)
reaching the market.43
2. While recognising that DG COMP’s powers under
Regulation 1/2003 are narrower than, for example, the UK
Competition Commission, and focus almost solely on the
conduct of undertakings,44 we were critical of the fact that the
Preliminary Report had missed a key part of the picture by
failing to examine the crucial role played by the regulatory
framework in the pharmaceutical industry. We suggested this
was an undetected “elephant in the room.”45
3. The Final Report goes a long way to remedying this
omission – certainty as far as delayed generic entry is
concerned. While the Final Report suggests that the conduct of
R&D-based pharmaceutical companies (‘originator
companies’46) may be one of the causes of delayed generic
entry and of the decline in NCEs reaching the market, it
accepts that shortcomings in the regulatory framework may
also explain and be a significant cause of these phenomena.
4. The question therefore arises as to how significant the
regulatory impact is compared to the impact of conduct by
originator companies. Or to pursue the elephant analogy: how
big is the elephant is in the room? We explore this below.
First, we analyse the data and the findings in the Final Report
as to the impact of regulation on generic entry. The Final
Report now seems to recognise that the primary cause of the
delays to generic entry identified by the sector inquiry is
regulatory in nature and not practices of originator companies.
Second, we assess the reasons put forward by the Final Report
for the decline in the number of NCEs. We note that the Final
Report falls short of engaging in a full-blown analysis of all
the regulatory factors that may explain this decline, with the
result that DG COMP is unable to properly evaluate “whether
the behaviour of originator companies might be among the
reasons for the difficulties to bring new medicines to the
market.”47 It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that
regulation may again be the primary reason for the decline in
NCEs.
40 This article is adapted from a presentation given by James Killick on
14 January 2009 at the Conference on the Commission’s Pharmaceutical
Sector Inquiry and entitled “Regulatory Issues and the Pharma Sector









43 Between 1995 and 1999, an average of 40 NCEs were launched while
between 2000 and 2007 that number had dropped to an average of 27 NCEs




44 See Powell & Innes-Stubb, “A Tale of Two Sector Inquiries: Comparing and
Contrasting Experiences in the U.K. and EU,” GCP Magazine, November
2008,
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?&id=1798&action=600.
45 See footnote 1 above and Killick and Dawes, “The Undetected Elephant in
the Room: An Analysis of DG Competition’s Preliminary Report on the
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry”, GCP Magazine, February 2009,
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?&id=1588&action=907.
46 Which DG COMP defines as companies that sell novel drugs that benefited
from patent protection when launched onto the market.
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II. Why did DG COMP open a
sector inquiry into the European
pharmaceutical sector?
5. On 15 January 2008, DG COMP opened48 a sector inquiry
into the pharmaceutical industry by way of unannounced
inspections – the first time that dawn raids have been used in a
sector inquiry. At that time, DG COMP said it had started the
inquiry to examine (a) delays to generic entry and (b) the
reasons behind fewer new pharmaceutical products being
brought to market, as the Competition Commissioner’s words
made clear: “Individuals and governments want a strong
pharmaceuticals sector that delivers better products and value
for money. But if innovative products are not being produced,
and cheaper generic alternatives to existing products are being
delayed, then we need to find out why and, if necessary, take
action.”49
6. DG COMP was therefore interested in investigating
causation when the sector inquiry was opened (“we need to
find out why”).
III. The 426-page Preliminary
Report of 28 November 2008:
What about the elephant?
7. The Preliminary Report claimed that originator companies
had recourse to a “toolbox” of practices50 in order to delay the
entry of generic medicines onto the market and that these
practices, where successful, “may increase the likelihood of
delays to generic entry” and “may significantly increase legal
uncertainty to the detriment of generic entry and can cost
public health budgets […] significant amounts of money.”51
8. The Preliminary Report also claimed that originator
companies applied defensive patenting strategies, primarily
aimed at blocking other originator companies in the
development of new medicines. In relation to the overlap
between the patents of one company and patent/R&D
programme of another, the Preliminary Report concluded that
this “creates significant potential for originator companies to
find their research activities blocked, with detrimental effects
on the innovation process.”52
9. However, on the key issue of the effect of regulation, the
Preliminary Report was almost entirely silent. Similarly, the
Preliminary Report did not address the issue of causation. The
quotes set out in the preceding two paragraphs were typical of
the Preliminary Report as a whole: the use of “may” and
“creates significant potential” rather than “will” or “does”. The
analysis was thus speculative and there was no finding that any
of the practices by originator companies caused generic delay
or a drop in innovation.
IV. An elephant which was the
subject of much critical comment
during the public consultation
after the publication of the
P reliminary Report
10. The failure to address the regulatory environment was the
subject of much critical commentary by stakeholders during
the public consultation following the publication of the
Preliminary Report.53 Many stakeholders pointed out that the
failure to take this factor into account meant that no
meaningful conclusions on causation could be drawn – in other
words, there was no causal link between the practices by
originator companies which the sector inquiry identifies and
generic delays / reduction in innovation.
11. In relation to delays to generic entry, a number of
stakeholders argued that national regulatory measures better
explain the significant disparities as to the average time for
generic entry amongst the different EU Member States than
the “toolbox” – since there was no evidence that the elements
of the “toolbox” were applied differently in different countries.
In particular, it was said that the way in which Member States
incentivise generic entry and the regulatory delays that generic
producers incur during the process of bringing a product to
market suggest that regulation was the major element at work.
12. Similarly, in relation to the lack of new innovative products
reaching the market, a number of regulatory reasons were put
forward to explain why there has been a drop in the number of
NCEs. These included national pricing and reimbursement
systems, cost-containment strategies, ever-higher requirements
that need to be met in order to obtain a marketing authorisation
and the increased costs of clinical trials.
48 Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the
pharmaceutical sector pursuant to Article 17 of Council Regulation No
1/2003 OJ [2008] C 59/06.
49 Commission Press Release IP/08/49 of 16 January 2008, ‘Antitrust:




50 According to ¶ 369 of the Preliminary Report, the “toolbox” was made up of
the following elements: secondary patenting; disputes and contacts; patent
litigation; patent settlements; interventions before regulatory bodies; other
interventions; and life cycle strategies.
51 Preliminary Report, p. 322. The Preliminary Report stated that savings of
EUR 14 billion had already occurred due to generic entry in the EU in 2000-
2007 and that a further EUR 3 billion could have been saved assuming that
generic entry had happened immediately i.e. on day one after patent expiry
in 2000-2007 in the EU Member States for essentially all the medicines that
went off patent in that period. 
52 Preliminary Report, p. 350.
53 These comments are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/index.html. 
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V. The 533-page Final Report
of 8 July 2009 spots the elephant
13. These comments appear to have been taken on board by
DG COMP in preparing its Final Report, which adopts a
markedly different tone and emphasis to the Preliminary
Report. While the “primary focus” remains “on those practices
which companies may use to block or delay generic
competition as well as to block or delay the development of
competing originator products” (¶ 15), the Final Report
accepts that “as the industry is strongly regulated and the
behaviour of the company needs to be assessed in the context
of the existing regulatory framework, the sector inquiry also
looked in broad terms at aspects of the regulatory framework”
(¶ 16).
1. Regulation and delays to generic
entry
14. The Final Report now recognises that “a number of
regulatory variables play an important role” (¶ 190) in relation
to how generic entry takes place:
! First, INN prescription by doctors and mandatory generic
substitution by pharmacists. Where Member States encourage
doctors to prescribe an active substance rather than a specific
product and oblige pharmacists to dispense the cheapest
generic available from those covered by a doctor’s
prescription, “generic entry in the first year appears to be
more prevalent” (¶ 190) and “the number of entrants tends to
be higher” (¶ 206);
! Second, the imposition of mandatory discounts (in
comparison to the pre-existing originator price) or price caps
on generic products. In Member States which use such
mechanisms, “the speed of entry appears to be lower” (¶ 197)
as these measures “may remove some of the advantage of first-
movers into the market (the first generic entrant to enter the
market has to give a mandatory discount, whereas otherwise it
might be able to offer mild price reductions compared to the
originator company until the point in time that other generic
companies enter the market as well)” (¶ 190). The number of
entrants also “appears to be lower” (¶ 206).
15. These findings are not surprising as a 2006 report by
Simeons and De Coster,54 commissioned by the European
Generics Association, had similarly found that generic entry
depends, to a large extent, on the approach adopted by the
Member States:
“Penetration of generic medicines is more successful in
countries that permit (relatively) free pricing of medicines (e.g.
Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom) than in countries
that have pricing regulation (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France,
Italy, Portugal, Spain). This is because countries that adhere to
free market pricing generally have higher medicine prices,
thereby facilitating market entry of generic medicines and a
higher price difference between originator and generic
medicines.”
“In Italy and Spain, the limited volume of generic medicines
consumption in combination with low medicine prices due to
certain supply-side measures has undermined the economic
viability of the generic medicines market.”
“Countries that have promoted generic medicines for 10-15
years naturally have a more mature generic market than
countries that have only recently implemented measures to
stimulate generic medicines use.”
16. The Final Report also acknowledges that the hurdles which
generic producers face when getting through the regulatory
process also contribute to delays:
! First, marketing authorisation bottlenecks. The Final Report
finds that bottlenecks – due to delays in procedures and
accessibility of slots, with some agencies already “fully
booked” until 2010 – “may lead to delayed access for
European patients to […] generic medicines” (¶ 1372);
! Second, national pricing and reimbursement systems. The
Final Report calls for Member States to fully comply with the
time-limits set out in the Transparency Directive (Directive
89/105) “in order to avoid delays to the benefit [detriment]55
of patients and applicant companies” (¶ 1432). It also invites
all Member States “to consider the introduction of national
p rovisions granting automatic/immediate pricing and
reimbursement status to generic products […] where the
corresponding originator product already benefits from
reimbursement based on a higher price” as this would lead to
“faster access of generic products” (¶ 1434).
17. These national regulatory factors do indeed appear to
explain why generic entry may be delayed more in some
countries than in others. They certainly explain the disparities
in generic entry between different EU Member States much
better than the original thesis, namely that practices of
originator companies were to blame – a hypothesis that was
suggested at the outset of the investigation but which was not
confirmed in the Preliminary Report, as it never came to any
conclusion on causation. The Final Report therefore sets the
record straight and concludes that “the Preliminary Report did
not suggest that the observed delays were exclusively due to
company behaviour, but emphasised that practices employed by
originator companies may contribute to the delays” (¶ 1512).
2. Regulation and the lack of new
innovative products reaching the market
18. The Final Report also considers certain regulatory aspects
which may explain the decline in the launch of new NCEs:
! External reference pricing. The use by certain Member
States of mechanisms whereby a price is set on the basis of the
54 “Sustaining Generic Medicines Markets in Europe”, Leuven, April 2006,
available at http://www.egagenerics.com/doc/simoens-report_2006-04.pdf. 55 The use of the word “benefit” appears to be a linguistic error.
Concurrences N° 3-2009 l Trends l The outcome of the EC pharmaceutical sector inquiry 21
prices in other Member States “can lead to delays in market
entry” (¶ 1443) because new products will not be launched in
lower-priced Member States until prices have been obtained in
higher-priced Member States;
! The fragmentation of national pricing and reimbursement
systems. The fact that pricing and reimbursement decisions are
increasingly taken at a regional/local or even hospital level
also “has an impact on the transaction costs to market the
products” (¶ 1445) and delays the launch of new products.
19. However, the Final Report falls short of engaging in a full-
blown analysis of all the regulatory factors which may explain
the decline in the number of innovative products reaching the
market in recent years. For example, there is no consideration
of the fact that regulatory requirements for the approval of
NCEs are higher now than they were a decade ago.56 If there is
a higher regulatory failure rate, this in itself could explain part
of the trend of lower numbers of NCEs reaching the market.
20. Similarly, the impact of the increased costs of clinical trials
is also ignored by the Final Report. While originator R&D
budgets continue to grow,57 costs are also growing. Clinical
trials have become more complex, due to increased difficulties
in enrolling patients, because patients already have treatments
for many diseases and because diseases are more complex.58
The increased cost of clinical trials may also make certain
research projects uneconomic, notably when viewed in
combination with the impact of pricing and reimbursement and
cost-containment strategies.
21. These regulatory factors therefore also plausibly explain
the decline in the number of NCEs reaching the market, yet, as
the Final Report admits, they were not considered by DG
COMP:
“the sector inquiry did not analyse which other important
factors – apart from company behaviour – could have
contributed to a decline in innovation as measured by less
novel medicines reaching the market. Reasons given by the
industry include increased scientific complexities, high
attrition rates in late state development due to regulatory risk
aversion and uncertainty about financial awards.”59
22. This gap in the analysis means that DG COMP is unable to
reach any hard conclusions as to whether the conduct of
originator companies has had any impact on the number of
NCEs reaching the market. This is presumably why DG
COMP has decided to focus only on relatively narrow conduct
which – presumably – it views as being potentially anti-
competitive: “defensive patenting strategies that mainly focus
on excluding competitors without pursuing innovative efforts
and/or the refusal to grant a license on unused patents will
remain under scrutiny in particular in situations where
innovation was effectively blocked.”60 Given the relative rarity
of defensive patenting,61 and the consequent unlikelihood that
defensive patenting could come close to explaining the
considerable decline in NCEs identified by DG COMP, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that regulation may again be
the primary factor in operation here.
VI. Conclusion
23. Regulation is one of the most relevant and important
elements in the pharmaceutical sector. The Final Report gives
this element the consideration it deserves. It concludes that
regulation goes to the heart of the question of why generic
entry is delayed, significantly in certain Member States. The
Final Report does not, however, explicitly reach any
conclusions on the impact of regulatory factors in relation to
the decline in NCEs, but the implicit conclusion in the report is
the same – regulatory factors are again at the heart of the issue.
24. DG COMP is to be congratulated for having taken the time
between the Preliminary and Final Reports to undertake this
analysis of the impact of regulation. Hopefully, the resulting
focus on regulatory improvements will enable faster generic
entry and greater innovation to the benefit of all patients in
Europe. It is now time to give the elephant a bit more attention
– and politely ask it to leave the room. !
56 See the Response of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
(‘ABPI’) to the Preliminary Report in the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,
paragraphs 8 to 10, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/abpi.pdf.
57 For example, in its December 2008 Communication entitled ‘Safe,
Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the
Pharmaceutical Sector’, COM(2008) 666 final, the Commission states that
the European pharmaceutical sector accounts for more than 17% of the EU’s
annual R&D expenditure.
58 See the Response of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries
and Associations (‘EFPIA’) to the Preliminary Report in the Pharmaceutical
Sector Inquiry, paragraph 120, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_pharma/efpia.pdf.
59 ¶ 21 of the Final Report.
60 ¶ 1574 of the Final Report.
61 ¶¶ 1117-1114 of the Final Report. While the Report gives certain examples
of defensive patenting strategies, it only finds “a few cases [where]
originator companies expressed concern about the patent strategies of a
competitor” (¶ 1336).
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1. Le rapport tant attendu de la Commission européenne qui
clôt l’enquête dans le secteur pharmaceutique est paru le
8 juillet 2009. La Commission a respecté le calendrier qu’elle
s’était fixé et qui avait débuté le 15 janvier 2008, par la
décision d’ouvrir une enquête, immédiatement suivie par des
inspections au sein de plusieurs laboratoires pharmaceutiques
de l’Union européenne. L’envoi de questionnaires, aussi bien
aux opérateurs du marché (100 laboratoires interrogés) qu’aux
Autorités de santé ou de concurrence des différents États
membres, a permis de compléter l’information de la
Commission. Puis, le 28 novembre 2008, la Commission a
publié un rapport préliminaire, proposant à tous les acteurs
intéressés (industriels, représentants des consommateurs,
assurance-maladie, office européen des brevets) de faire des
commentaires, jusqu’au 31 janvier 2008. L’étape suivante est
arrivée avec le rapport final.
2. La Commission avait justifié la nécessité d’une enquête
dans le secteur pharmaceutique par le poids des dépenses de
santé en Europe (en 2007, chaque Européen a dépensé en
moyenne 430 euros pour des médicaments) et par les
dysfonctionnements observés : retards dans la mise sur le
marché des médicaments génériques et recul apparent de
l’innovation, mesurée par le nombre de nouveaux
médicaments mis sur le marché. 
3. Les enquêtes sectorielles, prévues à l’article 17 du
Règlement 1/2003, permettent à la Commission de recueillir
toutes les informations nécessaires pour l’application future
des articles 81 et 82 du traité. Au cas d’espèce, l’enquête a
permis de rassembler à la fois un grand nombre de données
factuelles sur le fonctionnement du secteur et des données
statistiques, portant sur un échantillon de 219 principes actifs
(soit 50 % du chiffre d’affaires total des médicaments délivrés
sur ordonnance dans l’UE en 2007). Ces données chiffrées ont
été collectées pour les produits sélectionnés, dans les 27 pays
de l’Union, pour la période de 2000 à 2007 et ont servi de
support à une analyse économétrique.
4. Le rapport, fruit d’un énorme travail accompli, contient à la
fois une description du marché et du regard de la Commission
sur son fonctionnement (structure et impact de la mise sur le
marché des génériques) et sur les comportements des
laboratoires. Toutefois, il ne contient, à ce stade, aucune
orientation concernant la qualification des pratiques examinées
avec les règles communautaires en matière de concurrence.
Enfin, le rapport offre une conclusion qui lance des pistes à
explorer pour l’avenir.
5. Est proposée une présentation synthétique du rapport qui
suit le plan adopté par la Commission européenne, avant
quelques commentaires relatifs à son intérêt par rapport à la
situation française.
I. L’analyse du marché et
des médicaments remboursables
en Europe
1. Structure du marché
6. Le rapport indique que le secteur pharmaceutique est
fortement réglementé et orienté vers la recherche et
développement (R&D). Il précise cependant que les dépenses
de R&D des laboratoires princeps sont moins importantes que
celles de marketing (17 % contre 23 % du chiffre d’affaires
réalisé avec les médicaments sur ordonnance). Parmi ces 17 %
consacrés à la R&D, environ 1,5 % est consacré à la recherche
fondamentale pour découvrir de nouveaux médicaments et
15,5 % sont consacrés au développement, c’est-à-dire aux
essais pour vérifier que ces nouveaux médicaments sont
suffisamment sûrs et efficaces pour être commercialisés. Quant
aux coûts de fabrication, ils ont représenté, sur la période
observée, 21 % du chiffre d’affaires total des laboratoires
princeps. Le rapport indique que les laboratoires sont
tributaires, dans une large mesure, de l’achat des composés
auprès des tiers : en 2007, 35 % environ des molécules des
laboratoires princeps qui étaient en attente d’une autorisation
de mise sur le marché avaient été achetés ou produites sous
licence. Certains de ces tiers sont des petites ou moyennes
entreprises, présentes dans le secteur de la biotechnologie par
exemple. En revanche, pour les fabricants de génériques, le
plus gros poste de dépense est la fabrication (51 %), suivie du
marketing (13 %) et des activités de R&D, ce qui montre bien
que ces entreprises ont une structure de coût différente. Le
rapport relève que les laboratoires princeps sont très
dépendants des ventes de quelques médicaments “vedettes”
dont les brevets sont sur le point d’expirer (ou ont expiré).
Parmi les médicaments de l’échantillon, près de la moitié se
sont trouvés confrontés à l’arrivée des génériques sur leur
marché dès la première année qui a suivi l’expiration de leur
brevet (Certificat complémentaire de protection compris).
UN POINT DE VUE FRANÇAIS
Geneviève WIBAUX
Rapporteure permanente, Autorité de la Concurrence
The outcome of the EC pharmaceutical sector inquiry
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2. Impacts de la mise sur le marché
des génériques
7. Selon le rapport, il faut plus de sept mois, en moyenne
pondérée, pour qu’un médicament générique apparaisse sur le
marché, lorsque le princeps a perdu son exclusivité. Pour les
médicaments les plus vendus, ce délai est plus court – quatre
mois en moyenne. Il existe de grands écarts d’un pays à
l’autre. Les retards à l’entrée des génériques sur le marché ont
des conséquences importantes en termes d’économies pour les
systèmes de santé, car les prix de vente des génériques sont en
moyenne 25 % inférieurs aux prix des princeps avant la perte
de leur exclusivité. Deux ans après leur entrée, les prix des
génériques étaient en moyenne 40 % inférieurs au prix du
princeps. Les prix des princeps semblent aussi baisser après la
mise sur le marché d’un médicament générique. La part de
marché, en volume, des fabricants de génériques s’élevait à
30 % à la fin de la première année, et à 45 % au bout de deux
ans. Pour l’échantillon de médicaments analysés, pendant la
période 2000-2007, le rapport estime que les économies
réalisées grâce à la mise sur le marché de médicaments
génériques auraient pu être de 20 % supérieures à ce qu’elles
ont effectivement été – soit 3 milliards d’euros –, si cette mise
sur le marché avait été réalisée dès l’expiration du brevet.
II. L’analyse des comportements
des laboratoires pharmaceutiques
8. S’agissant des comportements des laboratoires sur le
marché, le rapport distingue entre ceux mis en œuvre par les
entreprises princeps vis-à-vis des fabricants de génériques et
ceux adoptés par les laboratoires princeps vis-à-vis d’autres
laboratoires princeps. Il souligne au préalable la multiplication
des brevets entre 2000 et 2007, et ajoute que ces brevets ont
essentiellement été déposés à la fin de la période de protection.
1. La concurrence entre laboratoire
princeps et fabricants de génériques
1.1. Les stratégies de dépôts des brevets
9. Le rapport commence par indiquer que le dépôt de nouveaux
brevets un peu avant la fin du brevet originel est devenu un
véritable outil pour les laboratoires pharmaceutiques afin
d’étendre la portée et la durée de la protection fournies par les
brevets. Il estime que le dépôt de nombreuses demandes de
brevet pour le même médicament, formant ce que l’on appelle
des grappes de brevets (“patents clusters”) ou maquis de
brevets (“patents thickets”), est devenu une pratique courante
qui gêne le développement des génériques qui sont obligés
d’aller en justice pour invalider ces brevets. Il considère que
même si la majorité de ces procès sont favorables aux
fabricants de génériques, ils retardent leur entrée sur le
marché. Se développent aussi, selon le rapport, les demandes
de brevet “divisionnaire”. Ce type de demande, prévu par le
droit des brevets, permet de scinder une demande initiale. Elle
n’a pas pour effet d’élargir le contenu de la demande initiale, ni
d’étendre la période de protection, mais peut prolonger le délai
dont dispose l’office des brevets pour examiner la demande, ce
qui a également pour effet d’accroître l’incertitude juridique
pour les fabricants de génériques62. Enfin, le rapport expose
que les laboratoires déposent des brevets pour des produits de
seconde génération qui sont en réalité les mêmes produits avec
une amélioration mineure. Le rapport observe que ces
différentes actions sont considérées comme des moyens très
efficaces pour créer des obstacles à l’entrée des génériques,
notamment commercialisés par des sociétés de petite taille. Le
rapport indique aussi que le procès en contrefaçon contre un
fabricant de générique est utilisé comme un signal vis-à-vis des
autres fabricants de génériques. L’arme du procès a de plus en
plus été utilisée à partir de 2000. Le rapport dénombre 698
différends relatifs à des brevets pour toute l’Union européenne,
engagés majoritairement par des laboratoires pharmaceutiques.
Sur ces 698 affaires, 223 ont fait l’objet d’un règlement amiable
et 326 se sont poursuivies devant les tribunaux, qui ont statué
définitivement sur 149 de ces affaires, et dans 62 % des cas dans
un sens favorable aux fabricants de génériques. Le rapport note
à cet égard que si dans la phase précontentieuse, les laboratoires
princeps invoquaient les brevets principaux, pendant l’action en
justice, c’étaient les brevets secondaires qui étaient en cause.
1.2. Les oppositions et recours
10. L’enquête indique que le taux d’opposition devant l’office
européen des brevets (OEB) est constamment plus élevé dans le
secteur pharmaceutique que dans d’autres secteurs, et que ces
oppositions, de la part des fabricants de générique, ont concerné
presque exclusivement des brevets secondaires, et enfin que près
de 60 % des décisions finales leur ont été favorables.
1.3. Les règlements amiables et autres
arrangements entre laboratoires et
fabricants de génériques
11. Le rapport dénombre 200 accords conclus entre 2000 et
juin 200863, concernant 49 molécules dont 63 % étaient des
“best-sellers” qui devaient perdre leur protection entre 2000
et 2007. Il note que la probabilité de conclure un accord pour
un laboratoire dépend de l’évaluation de ses chances de gagner
ou non un procès contre un fabricant de génériques. Il ajoute
que la moitié des accords limitent la possibilité d’entrée du
générique sur le marché et qu’une proportion non négligeable
de ces accords, non seulement limitent cette entrée, mais
prévoient des compensations à verser au fabricant de générique,
soit sous la forme d’un paiement direct, soit d’une licence, d’un
accord de distribution ou d’un accord accessoire (“side-deal”).
Les paiements directs sont intervenus dans plus de 20
règlements amiables et le montant total de ces transferts a été
supérieur à 200 millions d’euros64. Le rapport note également
qu’un tiers des accords conclus entre princeps et fabricants de
génériques concernaient des produits encore sous exclusivité.
62 Le 25 mars 2009, l’OEB a pris des mesures qui limitent les possibilités de
dépôt volontaire d’une demande de brevet divisionnaire et les délais dans
lesquels une telle demande peut être présentée.
63 En 2004 et 2005 le nombre d’accords conclus a été plus important en Europe
qu’aux États-Unis.
64 Ce type d’accords est très contrôlé par les autorités antitrust aux États-Unis. 
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1.4. Les autres types de pratiques
12. Le rapport signale que les interventions auprès des
pouvoirs publics ont été vérifiées dans un grand nombre de
cas. Les laboratoires feraient du lobbying auprès des
organismes délivrant les autorisations de mise sur le marché
(AMM) pour savoir quand vont sortir les génériques et pour
lier la délivrance de l’AMM du générique à la vérification de
l’expiration des droits de propriété intellectuelle du princeps
(“patent linkage”) ou encore font de la rétention de données
empêchant les génériques de copier le produit. Ils
dénigreraient aussi l’efficacité ou la sécurité des
génériques vis-à-vis de ces organismes. Le rapport note encore
la multiplication des procès, qui peuvent même être intentés
contre les autorités réglementaires, et qui, même s’ils sont
perdus dans la plupart des cas par les laboratoires, ont pour
effet de retarder l’entrée des génériques sur le marché. Des
pratiques commerciales sont aussi utilisées notamment des
actions de promotion intensives auprès des médecins ou des
pharmaciens : le rapport note à cet égard que le développement
de la vente directe qui peut gêner la pénétration des
génériques, et enfin les accords d’exclusivité avec les
fournisseurs de principe actif.
2. La concurrence entre laboratoires
princeps
2.1. Les stratégies développées avec
le dépôt des brevets
13. Le rapport note que le choix de la zone géographique où
seront déposés les brevets est important. Le dépôt d’un brevet
a d’abord pour objet de protéger le laboratoire contre les
suiveurs en créant un droit objectif dont l’efficacité sera
renforcée par des publications qui donneront une antériorité et
empêcheront d’autres laboratoires d’invoquer la nouveauté
lorsqu’ils demanderont un brevet. La stratégie de “division”
des brevets est aussi utilisée pour créer des barrières à la R&D
des autres laboratoires et notamment au dépôt de brevets
secondaires. Le rapport recense 1 100 cas de litiges potentiels
liés à des chevauchements de brevets détenus par des
laboratoires princeps, ce qui pourrait bloquer l’innovation.
Toutefois dans de nombreux cas, les laboratoires de princeps
ont réussi à prévenir les litiges potentiels, par exemple grâce à
des accords de licences. Cependant, dans 20 % des 99 cas
répertoriés, la licence a été refusée par le détenteur du brevet.
Le rapport dénombre 66 actions en justice (concernant
18 médicaments) engagées par les laboratoires princeps à
l’encontre d’autres laboratoires princeps. Il observe que dans
64 % des cas, les procès se sont conclus par un accord
amiable. Il relève que le nombre de procès achevés a été faible
et que les propriétaires des brevets ont perdu dans 77 % des
cas. Il signale aussi que dans la période 2000 à 2007, pour les
procès relatifs aux brevets secondaires, les laboratoires
s’opposant à ces brevets ont majoritairement gagné (89 % des
cas).
2.2. Opposition et recours
14. Entre 2000 et 2007, sur la base de l’échantillon de
médicaments, les laboratoires princeps se sont principalement
opposés aux brevets secondaires d’autres laboratoires princeps.
Les premiers ont très souvent obtenu gain de cause. Leur
position a prévalu dans près de 70 % des décisions rendues par
l’OEB (chambres de recours incluses). En outre, dans
19 autres cas sur 100, la portée des brevets a été réduite.
2.3. Accords amiables et autres accords
entre laboratoires princeps
15. Le rapport recense 27 accords amiables pour résoudre des
conflits pour la période étudiée et précise que 67 % de ces
accords concernaient des accords de licence. Mais il relève que
1 450 autres accords ont été conclus pendant la même période,
concernant majoritairement la phase de commercialisation des
produits plutôt que la R&D. Pour 80 % de ces accords – dont
la part de marché cumulée des entreprises contractante était
supérieure à 20 % – existaient des dispositions prévoyant un
type de relation d’exclusivité entre les entreprises, soit une
obligation de fourniture ou d’approvisionnement exclusif, de
licence exclusive ou toute autre sorte d’exclusivité et/ou une
obligation de non-concurrence. La durée moyenne de ces
accords comportant une obligation d’exclusivité était de huit
ans.
3. Quelles pistes pour l’avenir ?
16. Avant de formuler plusieurs recommandations qui visent
plutôt le cadre réglementaire, la Commission indique qu’elle
fera pleinement usage des pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par
les articles 81, 82 et 86 du Traité CE mais aussi par les règles
du contrôle des concentrations et des aides d’État. 
17. La Commission indique qu’elle n’hésitera pas à
sanctionner les pratiques de laboratoires qui auront pu avoir
pour objet ou pour effet de porter atteinte au libre jeu de la
concurrence. Elle signale qu’entre 2000 et 2007, les Autorités
de concurrence des États membres et la Commission ont déjà
pris des mesures et/ou sanctionné des laboratoires. Elle cite le
cas Napp65, le cas Schering Plough66 ; le cas GSK67 et l’affaire
Astra Zeneca68 dans laquelle ont été sanctionnés deux abus
d’un laboratoire en position dominante, ayant retardé l’entrée
des génériques sur le marché.
18. Pour réduire le risque que des règlements amiables ne
soient conclus au détriment des consommateurs, la
Commission indique envisager, dans le contexte juridique en
vigueur, un contrôle plus approfondi de ces arrangements, qui
sont susceptibles de léser les consommateurs européens.
65 Décision du 30 mars 2001, de l’OFT, disponible sur le site www.oft.gouv.
uk/shared_oft/ca_public_registrer/decisions/napp.pdf.
66 Décision 07-MC-06, disponible sur le site www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr.
67 Décision du 8 février 2006, disponible sur le site www.agcm.it/.
68 Décision du 15 juin 2005, affaire COMP/A.37.507/F3.
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19. Quant aux recommandations, elles concernent en premier
lieu le brevet européen : la Commission approuve les efforts de
l’office européen des brevets pour raccourcir la durée des
procédures d’opposition et d’appel. Elle appelle de ses vœux la
création d’un brevet communautaire unique et la mise en
place, en Europe d’un système de Règlement des litiges unifié
et spécialisé dans les brevets.
En deuxième lieu, la Commission demande que les procédures
de délivrance d’autorisation de mise sur le marché et de
fixation des prix par les Autorités nationales soient plus
transparentes et plus rapides. La Commission estime que les
progrès engendrés par la création de l’agence européenne du
médicament (EMEA) qui permet la délivrance d’une
autorisation unique de mise sur le marché d’un médicament
ont été un grand pas dans l’unification des procédures, mais
que ces progrès peuvent être réduits à néant si les États
membres ne sont pas vigilants et n’appliquent pas strictement
les règles de reconnaissance mutuelle prévues dans la directive
2001/83/CE. Elle rappelle que le “patent linkage”, qui consiste
à lier la délivrance d’une AMM par une Autorité de santé d’un
État membre à la vérification que les droits de propriété
intellectuelle sont expirés, est interdit. En matière de fixation
de prix et de taux de remboursement, la Commission exprime
les mêmes préoccupations et précise qu’elle va vérifier que
chaque Etat Membre  respecte les règles fixées par la directive
89/105/CE, à savoir un délai maximum de 90 jours laissé à
l’autorité réglementaire pour déterminer le prix et le taux de
remboursement, une fois accordée l’autorisation de mise sur le
marché. 
III. Conclusion
20. Le rapport final terminant l’enquête réalisée par la
Commission a le grand mérite donner une vision complète du
secteur. Mais son principal intérêt est d’avoir été centré sur la
question des relations entre le droit des brevets et le droit de la
concurrence, qui est le cœur de la problématique actuelle du
secteur pharmaceutique puisque l’innovation est nécessaire, et
doit être encouragée, sans que le prix à payer par la collectivité
par le biais de l’exclusivité temporaire n’excède le gain qu’elle
retire de l’innovation. Cette question est particulièrement
cruciale dans un pays comme la France, qui continue à
occuper la première place des pays européens en termes de
dépense moyenne par habitant en médicaments remboursables,
et où la lecture des statistiques de l’assurance-maladie montre
le poids des médicaments “nouveaux” dans la croissance des
dépenses en 2007 : 85 % de la hausse enregistrée en 2007
provenaient de produits mis sur le marché depuis moins de
3 ans. Or, selon l’assurance-maladie, les médicaments
“nouveaux” ne sont pas toujours des médicaments innovants :
dans la mesure où 45 % des dépenses supplémentaires
relatives aux médicaments nouveaux concernaient des
molécules qui ne présentaient pas ou peu d’amélioration du
service médical rendu par rapport à l’arsenal thérapeutique
préexistant. On peut noter, par ailleurs, que même si la France
a atteint un niveau de pénétration très élevé des génériques de
81,7 %, comparable à ses voisins européens, il subsiste encore
une proportion importante de prescriptions réalisées en dehors
du répertoire des génériques69 alors que la croissance des
médicaments génériques contribue à financer la croissance des
médicaments réellement innovants. !
69 À titre d’exemple, les Espagnols consomment près de 85 % de médicaments
antiulcéreux (IPP) génériqués (83 % pour les Allemands et 51 % pour les
Français).
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